We examine the impact of Georgia's 1997 
O
ver the last four decades, local governments have increasingly sought to diversify their revenue sources by augmenting local property tax revenues with revenues from other sources. Indeed, revenue diversification has become a particularly salient issue for many local governments as property tax limits, coupled with the unpopularity of the property tax, have limited their ability to raise property tax rates. While local governments now rely more heavily on a number of alternative revenue sources, as noted by Agrawal (2014) , the local option sales tax (LOST) has emerged as the single most important alternative revenue source for local governments. As of 2015, 38 states allowed local jurisdictions to impose LOSTs and LOST revenue now constitutes the second largest source of own revenue for local governments.
Despite the growing importance of the LOST in local public finance, few studies have examined how adoption or use of the LOST affects local government expenditures or the fiscal decisions of local governments more generally. What evidence is available comes primarily from studies that compare local revenues and expenditures in jurisdictions with and without a LOST.
1 For example, Jung (2001) and Zhao and Jung (2008) compare per-capita total spending and property tax revenues in Georgia counties that adopted a LOST to those that did not adopt a LOST. Their results suggest that LOST adoption led to small reductions in local property taxes per capita (i.e., some property tax relief) and increases in total spending.
2 Similarly, using a panel of the largest 101 cities in the United States over the period 1963 -1990 , Sjoquist, Walker, and Wallace (2005 compare per-capita total spending and property tax revenues in cities with a LOST to cities without a LOST. Their results suggest that LOST adoption has heterogeneous effects, with some cities using LOST revenue primarily for property tax relief and others using it principally to support spending increases. More recently, using national data and propensity score matching methods, Afonso (2014) compares property tax burdens and own-source revenues in counties with LOSTs to similar counties located in states that prohibit LOSTs and finds that LOST adoption results in both property tax relief and increases in own-source revenues. 3 While the existing literature provides important insights into how the adoption of LOSTs affects the fiscal outcomes of local jurisdictions, it nevertheless suffers from an important limitation: all of the aforementioned studies treat LOST adoption (or the revenue generated through LOSTs) as exogenous. Of course, the decision of whether or not to impose a LOST is likely endogenous for several reasons. First, jurisdictions that choose to adopt a LOST may differ in important ways based upon both observable and unobservable factors raising concerns about selection bias. 4 Second, the decision to adopt a LOST is likely simultaneously determined with decisions about spending levels and property tax rates. As a result, it is unlikely that the results from these previous studies have a causal interpretation.
1 There is also a parallel literature that examines the determinants of LOST adoption. See, for example, Burge and Piper (2012) , Sjoquist et al. (2007) , and Zhao (2005) . See Sjoquist and Stoycheva (2012) for a general discussion of local option sales taxes. 2 In a related study, Jung (2002) examines the impact of the special purpose LOST (SPLOST) in Georgia, which is earmarked for capital projects in Georgia counties, on per-capita capital and total spending. As in Jung (2001) and Zhao and Jung (2008) , Jung (2002) compares spending in counties that adopt the SPLOST to those that do not and finds that an additional dollar of SPLOST revenue increases total spending by 72 cents and reduces reliance on other tax and nontax revenue sources by 28 cents. 3 A few studies have also examined the effect of local income taxes on government expenditures and property tax burdens. Deran (1968) and Sjoquist, Walker, and Wallace (2005) compare cities with and without a local income tax and find that cities with a local income tax tend to have lower property tax burdens. Ross and Nguyen-Hoang (2013) examine the effect of school district income taxes in Ohio on property tax levies and total revenue and find that greater income taxation results in lower property taxes and higher total revenues. 4 Afonso (2014) appears to be the only study that attempts to address the issue of selection bias by using propensity score matching techniques. Nevertheless, propensity score matching still relies on the strong assumption that selection into treatment status depends only on observables.
In this paper, we provide new evidence on how LOST adoption affects the fiscal outcomes of local jurisdictions using an identification strategy that specifically addresses the endogeneity concerns that have plagued prior studies. We exploit Georgia's November 1996 enactment of a new state policy that allows school districts to impose a Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax for Education (ESPLOST) in order to examine how LOST adoption affects the fiscal outcomes of local school districts. 5 Georgia's ESPLOST legislation allows school districts to impose, subject to a popular referendum, a 1 cent sales tax to fund capital outlay projects, retire previously incurred debt, or some combination of the two. School districts are prohibited from using ESPLOST revenue to fund current spending.
Using school district-level financial data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) that spans the period 1991-2005, we employ both difference-indifferences (DD) and event study research designs to identify the causal impact of Georgia's ESPLOST program on four fiscal outcomes of local school districts: (1) per-pupil capital outlays; (2) per-pupil long-term debt; (3) per-pupil current operating expenditures, and (4) property taxes per pupil. Our identification strategy essentially compares pre-post ESPLOST adoption changes in these outcomes among Georgia districts to changes that occur in our control districts. 6 Because both the revenue raising capacity (sales tax base) and potential to export the sales tax burden tend to be higher in metropolitan areas (MSAs), we report separate results for the sample of school districts located inside MSAs and those located outside MSAs.
For districts located in MSAs, our DD results suggest that ESPLOST adoption led to significant increases in real per-pupil capital spending and significant declines in real per-pupil long-term debt and property tax receipts relative to control districts. We also find that while use of the ESPLOST was legislatively restricted to capital spending, ESPLOST adoption led to a significant increase in real current spending relative to control districts. In terms of magnitude, our results suggest that ESPLOST adoption caused real per-pupil capital spending to increase by 26.5 percent ($316) and real per-pupil current spending to increase by 4.3 percent ($407), relative to control districts. Similarly, adoption of an ESPLOST caused real per-pupil debt to decline by 23.9 percent ($718) and real per-pupil property tax receipts to decline by 4.9 percent ($132), relative to control districts.
A series of specification checks provides evidence that these results are highly robust. Using an event study research design, we consistently find no evidence that adoption 5 A caveat to our identification strategy is that it treats Georgia's adoption of the ESPLOST program in 1997 as an exogenous event. We address concerns over the potential endogeneity of Georgia's adoption of the ESPLOST program by estimating event study models that examine whether our outcomes of interest where trending either up or down prior to the adoption of an ESPLOST. 6 The control group consists of school districts located in the southeastern states of Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, as well as school districts in Georgia that had not yet adopted an ESPLOST. We note, however, that because the majority of Georgia school districts adopted an ESPLOST within the first several years after the passage of the ESPLOST legislation in 1997, the control group essentially includes districts located in other southeastern states.
of an ESPLOST affected our outcomes of interest in the years prior to adoption, suggesting that our estimates have a causal interpretation. Our results also persist across specifications where we redefine the control group to include only southeastern states where school districts are fiscally independent and thus capable of raising their own property tax revenues. Finally, our results remain robust in specifications where we add additional controls for state and federal aid. For districts located outside of MSAs, we also find that ESPLOST adoption led to a significant increase in real per-pupil capital spending relative to control districts. However, in stark contrast to the results for districts located in MSAs, we find no evidence that ESPLOST adoption caused a reduction in real per-pupil long-term debt, or a reduction in property tax burdens relative to control districts. Furthermore, while our DD results provide evidence that ESPLOST adoption led to a relative increase in real per-pupil current spending among non-metro districts, in our event study specifications we find evidence that current spending was trending higher prior to ESPLOST adoption. This casts some doubt on whether our current spending results for non-metro districts have a causal interpretation.
II. Background
Prior to 1997 Georgia school districts relied exclusively on local property tax revenue and state aid to construct and modernize school infrastructure. In January 1996, the State Legislature passed HR 728, which proposed an amendment to the Georgia Constitution authorizing the boards of education of county and independent school districts to impose, levy, and collect a 1 percent sales tax for certain educational purposes. The legislation was subsequently signed by the Governor in April 1996 and approved by voters in a state-wide constitutional amendment vote in November 1996. The amendment, commonly referred to as the ESPLOST, authorized boards of education in county school districts to levy a 1 percent sales tax upon approval of a simple majority of qualified voters residing within the limits of the local taxing jurisdiction. The ESPLOST can be imposed for up to five years and at any point during that time, the local board of education can hold another referendum to extend the tax. The ESPLOST program allows for: (1) capital outlay projects for educational purposes, which includes direct revenue financing or the issuance of new bonded debt for capital outlay that is repaid with ESPLOST revenue, (2) the retirement of previously incurred general obligation (GO) debt issued to fund capital outlay projects, and (3) some combination of these two.
8 Spending on non-capital related school expenditures, such as teacher salaries and other instructional expenditures, is not permitted.
7 While a new ESPLOST referendum can be passed prior to the expiration of the current ESPLOST, the new tax cannot be implemented until the previous ESPLOST has expired. As of July 2016, 94 percent of districts that had previously passed an ESPLOST reauthorized the tax prior to its expiration and thus had no breaks in taxation between different ESPLOSTs. 8 County school districts hold a single ESPLOST referendum and it applies to all school districts within the county. For counties that contain one of Georgia's 21 city school districts, the county and independent districts agree via a concurrent resolution to hold a single referendum and impose the ESPLOST tax county-wide. The independent school district receiving a proportional share of the revenue based on the city's number of full-time equivalent students.
The ESPLOST was designed to provide a flexible alternative to the property tax for school districts seeking to secure school construction and modernization funds. The ESPLOST can be used as a fund-building mechanism in which revenue is slowly collected over a number of years and then used to pay for construction projects on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. Alternatively, school districts can use an ESPLOST referendum to simultaneously obtain voter authorization to (1) approve an ESPLOST tax and (2) approve a GO bond issue funded by ESPLOST revenue. The ESPLOST program was also envisioned as an alternative way for school districts to retire previously incurred GO debt.
As noted by the Association of County Commissioners of Georgia, the ESPLOST has proven to be a popular alternative to the property tax for funding school capital expenditures. One measure of that popularity is the widespread use of the ESPLOST. Table 1 shows the number and percentage of school districts collecting an ESPLOST by year. By the end of fiscal year 1997-1998, the first year following the passage of the ESPLOST legislation, more than 74 percent of districts had implemented an ESPLOST. By 2000-2001, just three years after the passage of the ESPLOST legislation, approximately 90 percent of all districts had an ESPLOST in place and by [2008] [2009] , all but two districts had an ESPLOST in place. Another measure of the ESPLOST's popularity is the high passage rate of local referenda. Since the first ESPLOST referenda in 1997, 94 percent of all referenda (530 out of 562) were approved by voters. Finally, although school districts are still free to use the property tax to finance school facility investments, Sjoquist, Wallace, and Edwards (2004) , the effect of granting local jurisdictions access to an additional or alternative revenue source such as an ESPLOST is ambiguous. On the one hand, ESPLOST revenue may act as a substitute for local property taxes and thus have little or no effect on local expenditure levels. On the other hand, there are several reasons why adoption of an ESPLOST may lead to increased local spending. First, as noted previously, the ESPLOST legislation specifically authorized school districts to use ESPLOST revenue to fund capital outlay projects, retire previously incurred debt, or some combination of both. As a result, school districts could use ESPLOST revenues to achieve some combination of the following: (1) replace property tax revenues that had previously been set aside to fund future capital projects, (2) payoff previously incurred GO debt that was backed by property tax revenues, and/or (3) fund capital projects. Such a strategy could result in both higher capital spending and higher current spending since districts could divert property tax revenue that had previously been used to fund capital projects towards current spending. In that sense, even though ESPLOST revenue was explicitly earmarked for capital spending and debt reduction, the fungibility of ESPLOST revenue could lead to higher current spending. Second, and related to the first point, by broadening the tax base, local jurisdictions can set lower tax rates for a given level of revenue and thus potentially reduce the excess burden of taxation. This efficiency gain could motivate local residents to support both additional capital and current spending (Sjoquist, Wallace, and Edwards, 2004; Becker and Mulligan, 1998) . Third, the ability of local jurisdictions to export taxes onto nonresidents may differ depending on whether local public services are financed through a property tax or a sales tax. Tax exporting effectively provides local residents with a subsidy and thus reduces the effective tax price of local public services. Consequently, if the subsidy that tax exporting provides to local residents is greater under a sales tax than a property tax, voters may be inclined to adopt a LOST and to support higher levels of spending.
10 Consistent with that notion, Zhao (2005) , Sjoquist et al. (2007) , and Burge and Piper (2012) find that jurisdictions with greater ability to export the sales tax burden (which tend to be urban jurisdictions) are also more likely to adopt LOSTs and adopt them sooner than other jurisdictions.
Fourth, Buchanan (1967) among others have argued that because revenue diversification leads to a more complex and fragmented revenue system, voters may systematically underestimate their true tax burden and thus support higher levels of public spending than they otherwise would have, a phenomena commonly referred to as the revenue complexity hypothesis.
11 Related to the revenue complexity hypothesis, the sales tax may simply represent a less salient form of taxation to residents than the property tax, thus causing residents to underestimate the true burden of the sales tax.
12 As Cabral and Hoxby (2012) note, homeowners typically write one or two checks a year to pay their property taxes, making those tax payments highly salient. In contrast, if a person wishes to understand how much they have paid in sales taxes over the past year, they must aggregate for themselves the sales tax payments made over a large number of purchases. As a result, when local public services are financed with a less salient tax such as the sales tax, voters may be more inclined to support higher levels of public spending.
Finally, while the mechanisms described above (reductions in the excess burden of taxation, tax exporting, tax salience, etc.) all suggest that ESPLOST adoption may lead to higher capital spending by lowering either the actual or perceived cost of capital, there is at least one reason why ESPLOST adoption may lead to lower current spending. Specifically, a number of studies have found that capital and labor (i.e., current expenditures) are substitutes for one another in the production of educational outputs (Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong, 1992; Callan and Santerre, 1990) . Thus, holding school quality constant, an increase in capital spending, brought about by either a real or perceived reduction in the cost of capital following the adoption of an ESPLOST, may cause districts to reduce current spending. 13 The impact of ESPLOST adoption on current spending is therefore ambiguous.
III. data
Our primary source of data is the Local Education Agency (School District) Finance Survey (F-33) maintained by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The F-33 surveys contain detailed annual revenue and expenditure data for all school districts in the United States for the period 1990-1991 through the present. As noted previously, we focus on four fiscal outcomes of local school districts: (1) per-pupil capital outlays, (2) per-pupil long-term debt, (3) per-pupil current expenditures, and (4) property taxes per pupil. We measure school district capital outlays as the sum of construction expenditures (expenditures on structures, additions, replacements, and major alterations) and expenditures for land acquisition and other fixed assets. We measure long-term debt as the amount of bonded indebtedness and any other interest-bearing debt with a term of more than one year that is outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. Current expenditures are measured as total current expenditures for the daily operation 11 See Oates (2005) , Turnbull (1998) , Oates (1988), and Wagner (1976) for more detailed discussions of, and evidence on, the revenue complexity hypothesis. See Carroll (2009) for a review of the literature. 12 Wagner (1976) makes this point in his discussion of fiscal illusion and revenue complexity. Furthermore, the highly salient nature of the property tax, especially relative to more indirect and less salient taxes like the sales tax, has long been argued to be at the root of popular dislike of the property tax (Cabral and Hoxby, 2012; Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen, 2015) . 13 Of course, a real or perceived reduction in the cost of capital might also induce local residents to demand a higher level of school quality in which case residents might support higher levels of both capital and current spending.
of schools which includes salaries and benefits for school personnel, books, and other support material. Finally, we measure property taxes as total general property tax receipts received by a school district in a given fiscal year. All of these variables are divided by enrollment to obtain per-pupil measures and are adjusted to real 2014 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). We also used data from the F-33 surveys to create a number of control variables that we use in some of our specifications. Those variables are: (1) per-pupil state aid for capital outlays, (2) per-pupil general state aid, that is, state general formula assistance plus aid for specific programs such as special education, bilingual education, gifted and talented programs, and vocational education programs, and (3) total per-pupil federal aid.
14 All three of these variables are adjusted to real 2014 dollars using the CPI. Finally, we use data from the NCES Common Core of Data and the School District Demographic System to create a number of control variables that capture the economic and demographic characteristics of school districts. Those variables are: (1) district enrollment, (2) enrollment squared, (3) the fraction of students that are White and non-Hispanic, (4) the fraction of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, (5) the growth rate of enrollment, and (6) median household income. 15 We measure the growth rate of enrollment as the five-year percentage change in enrollment within a school district. To obtain our measure of median household income, we used data from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses and the 2005-2009 American Community Survey, to construct annual estimates of the median household income in each district using linear interpolation methods. We adjusted the annual income estimates to real 2014 dollars using the CPI. All these variables are designed to capture district characteristics that might influence our outcomes of interest. distribution in a given year.
17 Third, property tax revenues for Georgia's 21 independent city school districts are not reported in the F-33 school district finance surveys. Specifically, the NCES reports property tax revenues and other local revenues for independent city school districts in Georgia under a separate code for "taxes for education levied by separate county and city governments and transferred to the school system revenues from counties." We therefore are unable to separate property tax revenues from other tax revenue like ESPLOST revenue that is transferred from counties to their independent school districts. As a result, we omit independent city school districts in Georgia from specifications where the dependent variable is per-pupil property tax receipts.
Finally, we limit our sample to include data from fiscal years 1991-1992 through 2005-2006. We impose this restriction for several reasons. First, the earliest available data on school district financial transactions is from 1990-1991 and in that year the NCES did not collect information on a number of our key variables, namely, local property tax revenue, long-term debt, and state aid for capital outlays. Second, the ESPLOST program in Georgia was passed in November 1996 and the first ESPLOST referenda were held in 1997. Ending our time frame with the 2005-2006 year provides us with nine years of post-policy adoption observations, which should be long enough to observe any effect the ESPLOST program may have had on our outcomes of interest. It is also short enough to limit contamination from other policy changes or events (e.g., the Great Recession) that might have differentially affected the school districts in our sample. Table 2 provides the mean and standard deviation of the variables used in our analysis. For comparison purposes, we present these summary statistics for the sample of districts located in Georgia and those located in the controls states. To provide additional context on the evolution of our outcomes both before and after Georgia's adoption of the ESPLOST program, Figure 1 plots the state-level averages of our outcomes from 1991-1992 through 2005-2006 for districts located in MSAs. Each panel illustrates the annual evolution of one of our outcomes in Georgia, and the annual evolution of the same outcome among districts located in the control states.
18 Panels A and C show a relatively clear increase (relative to the control states) in real per-pupil capital and current spending in Georgia following the adoption of the ESPLOST program in 1997. Panel B also shows a clear and discernable decline in real per-pupil debt among Georgia school districts starting in 1999 and Panel D shows a decline in real per-pupil property tax receipts relative to districts located in control states. Figure 1A of the Online Appendix illustrates the annual evolution of our outcomes for districts located outside of MSAs. In contrast to Figure 1 , Figure 1A shows no clear changes in the evolution of our outcomes before or after Georgia's adoption of the ESPLOST program. The one exception is real per-pupil capital spending where we see some evidence of an increase in spending among Georgia school districts relative to spending among districts in the control states.
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IV. EmpIrIcal FramEwork
To examine whether and how the introduction of Georgia's ESPLOST program affected the fiscal decisions of school districts, we estimate models of the form:
where y ist denotes an outcome of interest (real capital spending per pupil, real debt per pupil, etc.) for district i, in state s in year t, Adopt ist is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if district i adopted an ESPLOST in year t, x ist is a vector of district-level control variables, d is and are λ t vectors of school district and year fixed effects, respectively, and ε ist is a random disturbance term. Note that because no state other than Georgia implemented an ESPLOST program during our sample timeframe, Adopt ist always equals zero for school districts in our control states and only takes the value of one for school districts in Georgia if an ESPLOST was in place in year t (i.e., a district had implemented an ESPLOST in year t following a successful ESPLOST referendum). The coefficient of primary interest in Equation (1) is γ , which is the difference-in-differences (DD) estimate of the effect of treatment (ESPLOST adoption) on our outcomes of interest.
In the empirical work that follows, we estimate Equation (1) separately for the sample of districts located inside MSAs and the sample of districts located outside MSAs. Our rationale for estimating separate equations based on metro-area status relates to the amount of revenue the ESPLOST is likely to generate and the potential for school districts to export the sales tax burden onto non-residents. 20 Both the revenue raising capacity (sales tax base) and potential to export the sales tax burden tend to be higher in metropolitan areas where shopping centers tend to be located and population density is highest. Consistent with that notion, Zhao and Hou (2008) , Rubenstein and Freeman (2003) , and Burge and Piper (2012) all find that that sales tax bases tend to be significantly higher in urban counties. Similarly, Burge and Rogers (2011) find that cities with large retail bases are better able to export the sales tax burden associated with LOSTs.
In addition to the basic DD specification given by Equation (1) we also estimate models based on an event study specification by replacing Adopt ist in Equation (1) with a series of lead and lag indicators for when district i adopted an ESPLOST. Specifically, we estimate models of the following form:
where, T j,ist represents a series of lead and lag indicator variables for when district i adopted an ESPLOST, µ ist is a random disturbance term and all other terms are as defined in Equation (1). We re-center the year of adoption so that T 0,ist always equals one in the year in which district i adopted an ESPLOST. We include indicator variables for one, two, and three years prior to adoption of an ESPLOST (T -3,ist , T -2,ist ,T -1,ist ), years zero through four after adoption (T 0,ist -T 4,ist ), and year five forward. The omitted category is, therefore, four or more years prior to adoption of an ESPLOST.
The coefficients of primary interest in Equation (2) are the γ j 's, which represent the DD estimates of the impact of ESPLOST adoption on our outcomes of interest in each year from t -3 to t +5 . The estimated coefficients on the lead treatment indicators (γ -3 , γ -2 , γ -1 ) provide evidence on whether our outcomes of interest were trending prior to the time district i adopted an ESPLOST. If our estimates have a causal interpretation, these lead treatment indicators should either be statistically insignificant or opposite in sign of the lagged treatment indicators. The lagged treatment indicators (γ +1 , ... , γ +5 ) allow the effect of ESPLOST adoption to evolve slowly over time, as one might expect given the lags associated with school facility investment decisions. For example, once a school district enacts an ESPLOST, it typically takes some time before the district either accumulates the revenue necessary to finance a capital project and/or go through the bonding process. Due to this lagged effect, one might expect only small changes in our outcomes of interest in the years immediately following the enactment of an ESPLOST, rather than a discrete shift in our outcomes of interest which is assumed when we model the treatment effect using a single treatment indicator as in Equation (1). Consistent with our simpler DD specification given by Equation (1) we estimate Equation (2) separately for the sample of districts located inside MSAs and those located outside MSAs.
An important issue related to the estimation of Equations (1) and (2) involves whether or not to control for state aid for capital outlays in specifications where the dependent variable is capital spending. On the one hand, state aid is potentially endogenous (and clearly endogenous when aid is of a matching nature) making it a questionable control variable. On the other hand, we are primarily interested in local school district responses to the adoption of a local option sales tax. However, because the NCES only reports aggregate school district capital expenditures, we cannot separate capital spending that is financed from own source revenue from capital spending that is financed with state aid. Controlling for state aid for capital outlays mitigates that limitation since it allows us to condition out the portion of total capital spending that is financed by the state.
Perhaps more importantly, state aid for capital outlays tends to vary significantly across states and within states across time. This raises the concern that, absent any control for state aid for capital outlays, changes in state aid could confound our treatment effects. For example, in 1994 Georgia enacted the Exceptional Growth Program, which provides state funding for school facilities to districts that are experiencing high enrollment growth. The state legislature began funding the program in 1996 when it authorized $100 million in annual support for the program. The timing of the enactment of the Exceptional Growth Program is obviously quite close to the passage of Georgia's ESPLOST program, thus raising concerns that the new state aid program could confound our estimates of the impact of the ESPLOST program on school district capital expenditures. A number of our control states also made significant changes in their state aid programs for capital outlay over our sample time frame. For instance, in 2002, Florida voters passed a class size reduction amendment, which led the state legislature to allocated $2.5 billion in facilities funding to implement the amendment. Similarly, in 1998, Virginia established the Public School Construction Grants Program to provide direct grants for school facilities and in 1996 North Carolina issued $1.96 billion in bonds for school facility improvements.
In the empirical work that follows, we address this issue by controlling for per-pupil state aid for capital outlays while accounting for the potential endogeneity of that aid using an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, all the states in our sample distribute state aid to local school districts using one of the following methods: (1) closed-ended matching grants, (2) lump sum aid, or (3) some combination of the two. Consequently, to create our instrumental variable, we exploit the fact that while district-level state aid is potentially endogenous and clearly endogenous when that aid is administered as a closed-ended matching grant as in Georgia, the total amount of aid available to school districts in each year is limited by the plausibly exogenous authorization level set by the state legislature. 21 We therefore instrument for district-level per-pupil state aid for capital outlays using each states' annual per-pupil authorization for school capital outlays (i.e., the amount authorized by the state legislature in each year divided by total enrollment in the state). Unfortunately, we do not observe annual state authorization levels for all of our control states. However, of the ten states in our control group, seven apportioned state aid for capital outlays on a lump-sum (per pupil) basis, implying this aid can be treated as exogenous. Among the remaining three states, Louisiana provided no state aid for capital outlays, and Alabama and Virginia had programs in place during various points of our sample time frame that were a combination of lump sum and closedended matching grants. For Virginia, we observe annual state authorization levels and thus use those to construct our instrument. For the remaining states, we proxy annual state authorization levels using the state-level sum of all state aid for capital outlays provided to districts in a given year divided by total state enrollment. 22 In addition, we also present results based on specifications where we omit state aid for capital outlays from the set of control variables and specifications where we directly control for actual per-pupil state aid for capital outlays for comparison purposes.
V. rEsults
a. dd Estimates for districts located inside msas
Results based on the estimation of Equation (1) for districts located in MSAs are presented in Table 3 . Each column presents results from separate regressions that, with the exception of Column 1, include the same set of control variables but different outcomes. The standard errors reported in Table 3 and all subsequent tables are clustered at the district-level to allow for within-district autocorrelation of the disturbance term.
Column 1 of Table 3 reports results based on a specification where the dependent variable is real per-pupil capital expenditures and state aid for capital outlays is omitted from the set of controls. The results suggest that ESPLOST adoption led to approximately a $220 increase in capital spending relative to control districts, an effect that 21 As an example, the Georgia state legislature authorized $100 million per year for the Capital Outlay Program from 1991 through 1995. In 1996, an additional $100 million was authorized for the new Exceptional Growth Program. From 1997 through 2005, the state annually authorized between $140 and $200 million for these programs with 2003 being the exception when the state authorized $300 million for the programs. 22 Two states in the southeastern United States, Delaware and Maryland, provide state aid for capital outlays using open-ended matching grants. The open-ended nature of these grants makes annual state authorization levels endogenous. As a result we omit these states from our control sample. Also note that because we do not observe the annual authorization level for Alabama, which bases some of its support on a closedended matching grant, our proxy for annual authorizations is potentially endogenous if more funds were authorized than actually apportioned. We note, however, that our results are robust to excluding Alabama.
table 3
Districts Located in MSAs: DD Estimates Turning next to the real long-term debt results reported in Column 3, we find that following the adoption of an ESPLOST districts located in MSAs experienced approximately a $718 decline in real long-term debt per pupil relative to control districts. Finally, the results reported in Columns 4 and 5 suggest that following adoption of an ESPLOST, districts located in MSAs experienced approximately a $407 increase in real per-pupil current expenditures and a $133 decrease in real per-pupil property tax receipts, respectively, relative to control districts. Our finding that ESPLOST adoption led to a statistically significant increase in real current expenditures is perhaps the most surprising given that the ESPLOST legislation specifically prohibited school districts from using ESPLOST revenue to fund current spending. Nevertheless, this result is consistent with several of the proposed mechanisms discussed in Section II concerning how revenue diversification alters the fiscal behavior and choices of local jurisdictions. Furthermore, it is consistent with the notion that even though ESPLOST revenue was explicitly earmarked for capital spending and debt reduction, the fungibility of ESPLOST revenue could lead to higher current spending.
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To put the results reported in Table 3 into context, it is instructive to consider the effect ESPLOST adoption had on our outcomes in terms of percentage changes rather than simply dollar amounts. To do so, we used the results reported in Table 3 to predict the counterfactual level of spending (or debt) that Georgia school districts would have experienced if the ESPLOST program had not been adopted and used that counterfactual prediction to convert our treatment effects into percent changes. 26 Using that 23 The F-statistic for the excluded instrument in the first stage (annual state-level capital aid authorizations) is 361, implying our instrument has sufficient power. 24 The significant increase in the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the ESPLOST adoption indicator when we control for state aid for capital outlays reinforces the notion that coincidental timing in state adoption of state capital aid programs, and changes to those programs, confounds estimates of the treatment effect. 25 Our results are consistent with those of Blackwell et al. (2006) who find that local governments in South Carolina used accommodations tax revenues that were earmarked for tourism promotion to increase spending in other areas. On the other hand, our results contrast those of Afonso (2015) who examines the impact of LOST revenues partially earmarked for transportation projects in California on county transportation expenditures and all other expenditures. She finds that county spending on transportation increased by more than the revenue generated by the LOST and no evidence that counties took advantage of the fungibility of the LOST revenue. 26 Technically, predicting the counterfactual level of spending simply involves subtracting the point estimates on the ESPLOST adoption indicator reported in Table 3 (i.e., treatment effects) from the average value of our outcomes in Georgia in the post adoption period. This gives us the "predicted" level of spending/ debt that a district in Georgia would have experienced without the ESPLOST. The percentage change in spending is then found by dividing the treatment effect by the counterfactual level of spending.
procedure, our results suggest that adoption of an ESPLOST caused real per-pupil capital spending to increase by 26.5 percent (based on Column 2) and real per-pupil current spending to increase by 4.3 percent, relative to control districts. Similarly, adoption of an ESPLOST caused real per-pupil debt to decline by 23.9 percent and real per-pupil property tax receipts to decline by 4.9 percent, relative to control districts. Another way to put these results into context is to compare them to the amount of revenue generated by the ESPLOST. On average, districts that adopted an ESPLOST annually raised approximately $940 per pupil in sales tax revenue. From Table 3 , we see that this increase in revenue was associated with approximately a $300 and $400 increase in per-pupil capital and current spending, respectively, as well as a $700 decrease in per-pupil debt and a $130 decrease in per-pupil property tax receipts relative to control districts. Table 4 reports results based on the estimation of Equation (1) for districts located outside MSAs. A brief inspection of Table 4 reveals that in the real per-pupil capital and current expenditures specifications the estimated coefficients are quite similar to those reported in Table 3 , although the estimated coefficient on the ESPLOST adoption indicator is larger in Table 4 . The starkest differences between the results reported in Table  3 and those reported in Table 4 relate to the real per-pupil long-term debt and property tax results. Specifically, in Column 3 of Table 4 (long-term debt), the estimated coefficient on the ESPLOST adoption indicator is now positive and statistically significant and in Column 5 (property tax receipts) the estimated coefficient is also positive but small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
B. districts located outside msas
We interpret these results as suggesting that metro-area districts were substantially more likely to use the ESPLOST to reduce their long-term debt and property tax burdens than their non-metro area counterparts. The finding that real long-term debt increased in non-metro districts following the adoption of the ESPLOST suggests these districts primarily used the ESPLOST to back the issuance of GO bonds, which in turn increased long-term debt. In fact, this is the most common way school districts fund school facility investments. In contrast, our finding that among districts located in MSAs, real long-term debt decreased following the adoption on an ESPLOST suggests some combination of the following: (1) metro-area districts were able to use the ESPLOST as a pay-as-you go funding stream and therefore no longer needed to issue GO bonds to finance capital outlays 27 and/or (2) that metro-area districts used the ESPLOST to pay off previously incurred long-term debt, an option that was specifically built into the ESPLOST legislation. We explore these possibilities in more detail in Tables 7 and  8 where we present event-study estimates. 
c. robustness
The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 consistently suggest that, relative to control districts, ESPLOST adoption led to significant increases in real per-pupil capital and current spending for school districts located both within and outside MSAs. Our results also suggest that ESPLOST adoption led to significant declines in real per-pupil debt and property tax burdens relative to control districts, but these effects were limited to school districts located within MSAs. We now turn to examining the robustness of our results to a number of specification issues.
The first issue we investigate if whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of controls for aid from either the state or federal government. Specifically, while Tables 3 and 4 already report results with and without a control for state aid for capital outlays, it is instructive to examine whether the results for our other outcomes are robust to the inclusion of state and/or federal aid controls. In Table 5 , we report results based on specifications where we add controls for real per-pupil state aid for capital outlays to the long-term debt specification and real per-pupil general state and federal aid to the current expenditure and property tax receipts specifications.
28 For completeness, Column 1 of Table 5 also reports results for the capital expenditure specification where we simply control for real per-pupil state aid for capital outlays, rather than instrumenting for that variable using annual state-level capital aid authorizations.
For comparison purposes, the top panel of Table 5 replicates the results reported in Columns 2-5 of Table 3 (metro districts) while the 3 rd panel replicates the results reported in Columns 2-5 of Table 4 (non-metro districts). In the interest of brevity we only report the estimated coefficients on the ESPLOST adoption indicator and the state and federal aid controls but we note that all of the specifications reported in Table 5 include the full set of control variables listed in Columns 2-5 of Tables 3 and 4. As shown in Panels 2 and 4, controlling for state and federal aid has little impact on our results. In the real current expenditures specification (Column 3), controlling for general state and federal aid reduces the estimated coefficient on the ESPLOST adoption indicator from $407 to $324 in the metro district sample and from $648 to $548 in the non-metro district sample but both estimates remain statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The estimated coefficients reported in Columns 1, 2, and 4, change little when we control for state and/or federal aid.
The second issue we investigate is whether our results are robust to the control group chosen for the analysis. Specifically, one potential concern with the results presented Tables 3 and 4 , respectively, for comparison purposes. Columns 1 and 2 of Panels 2 and 4 add controls for district-level state capital aid per pupil while Columns 3 and 4 of Panels 2 and 4 add controls for district-level state general aid per pupil and federal general aid per pupil. All specifications also include the full set of demographic control variables listed in Tables 3 and 4 . Robust standard errors clustered at the school district level in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
thus far is that our sample includes both fiscally independent and fiscally dependent school districts. The distinction is potentially important for several reasons. First, the NCES F-33 financial transaction files do not directly report local property tax revenues for fiscally dependent school districts which have no independent taxing authority and receive most of their local revenue from their parent government. As noted by the U.S. Census Bureau (2003), "Although most of these monies come from property tax collections, the exact amounts derived from taxes or other revenue sources available to parent governments for their school systems frequently cannot be determined from state education agency accounting records." As a result, our per-pupil property tax measure may suffer from measurement error, which in turn could reduce the precision of our estimates in the property tax specifications. Second, and more importantly, the fact that all of Georgia's 180 school districts are fiscally independent, while all of the school districts in three of our control states are fiscally dependent, raises the concern that states with fiscally dependent school districts may not represent an appropriate counterfactual for our DD specifications.
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In light of those issues, in Table 6 we report results based on models that are identical to those reported in Table 5 except we now limit the sample to fiscally independent school districts. 30 Limiting the sample of control states to those with fiscally independent school districts has little impact on the results: the estimates reported in Table 6 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 5 for both metro and non-metro districts. 
d. Event study Estimates
We now turn to results based on Equation (2), which replaces the ESPLOST adoption indicator in Equation (1) with lead and lag indicator variables for the years before and after the adoption of an ESPLOST. These event study estimates are reported in Tables  7 and 8 . Once again, in the interest of brevity we report only the estimated coefficients on the lead and lag indicators; however, all specifications include the full set of control variables listed in Columns 2-5 of Tables 3 and 4.  Table 7 reports event study estimates for the sample of districts located in MSAs. Turning first to the estimated coefficients in the capital expenditure specification 29 The states with fiscally dependent school districts are: North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. 30 Similar to Table 5 , we only report the estimated coefficients on the ESPLOST adoption indicator and the state and federal aid controls but note that all specifications include the full set of controls listed in Columns 2-5 of Tables 3 and 4 . 31 A final concern with the results presented thus far relates to Georgia's rollout of a universal pre-K program in 1995-1996, just several years prior to the implementation of the ESPLOST program. The timing of Georgia's adoption of a universal pre-K program raises the concern that our current expenditure results may be driven by increased state funds to implement the pre-K program. We explore that possibility in Tables 5A and 6A of the Online Appendix and find no evidence that our results are sensitive to Georgia's adoption of a universal pre-K program. See https://sites.google.com/site/ericbrunner1/research for these results.
table 6
Fiscally Independent School Districts (Column 1), all of the estimated coefficients on the post-policy adoption indicators are positive and statistically significant. The results suggest that one year after adoption of an ESPLOST real capital expenditures rise by approximately $370 relative to comparison districts and remain higher than the capital expenditures of comparison districts in all subsequent years post adoption. In contrast, in the pre-policy period there is no evidence that real per-pupil capital expenditures were trending upwards in districts that adopted an ESPLOST: the estimated coefficients on the pre-policy treatment indicators Table 3 . Robust standard errors clustered at the school district level in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
are generally small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. The fact that we find no evidence that capital spending among districts that adopted an ESPLOST was trending higher prior to adoption provides evidence that ESPLOST adoption is causally associated with an increase in capital spending. Turning next to the results for real long-term debt (Column 2), the estimated coefficients on the treatment indicators for the year a district adopts an ESPLOST and the first year after adoption are positive, with the coefficient on the indicator for the year of Table 4 . Robust standard errors clustered at the school district level in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
adoption being relative large in magnitude and statistically significant. However, starting two years after adoption, the estimated coefficients on the post-policy adoption indictors all turn negative and are typically statistically significant. Our finding that real long-term debt increased relative to control districts in the initial years following the adoption of an ESPLOST suggests that school districts initially used the ESPLOST primarily to back the issuance of GO bonds, which in turn increased long-term debt. Similarly, our finding that real long-term debt decreased relative to control districts two or more years after the adoption of an ESPLOST suggests that districts that initially used the ESPLOST to back the issuance of GO bonds began to pay off previously incurred debt in later years. Finally, we note that all of the estimated coefficients on the pre-policy adoption indicators are statistically insignificant, once again providing evidence that our results have a causal interpretation. In the real current expenditure specification (Column 3) we find that all of the estimated coefficients on the post-policy adoption indicators are positive and statistically significant and that the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients tend to increase over time. Thus, our results suggest that adoption of an ESPLOST led to an increase in real current expenditures relative to control districts. Furthermore, the fact that all of the estimated coefficients on the pre-policy adoption indicators are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant reinforces the notion that these results have a causal interpretation. Finally, in the real property tax receipts specification (Column 4) we once again find that all of the estimated coefficients on the pre-policy adoption indicators are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. In contrast, all of the estimated coefficients on the post-policy adoption indicators are negative, and with the exception of the coefficient on the indicator for five or more years post adoption, statistically significant. We interpret these results as suggesting that among districts located in MSAs, adoption of the ESPLOST led a decline in property tax burdens relative to control districts. Table 8 reports event study estimates for the sample of districts located outside MSAs. For capital spending (Column 1) the results reported in Table 8 tend to mirror those reported in Table 7 . In contrast, the results reported in Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table  8 differ markedly from the corresponding results reported in Table 7 . Specifically, in Column 2 (real long-term debt), we find that among non-metro districts, ESPLOST adoption led to an increase in long-term debt relative to control districts, as witnessed by the fact that all but one of the post-policy adoption indicators are positive and typically statistically significant. These results suggest that non-metro districts primarily used the ESPLOST to back the issuance of GO bonds, which in turn led to an increase in their long-term debt. Similarly, in Column 4 we find that if anything, ESPLOST adoption led to an increase in real property tax receipts per pupil relative to control states. However, the coefficients on the lead policy indicators suggest that property tax receipts were trending higher in districts that adopted an ESPLOST even prior to adoption. These results are in sharp contrast to the results reported in Column 4 of Table 7 where we find no evidence that per-pupil property tax receipts were trending higher prior to ESPLOST adoption and strong evidence that per-pupil property tax receipts declined relative to control districts post ESPLOST adoption.
Finally, turning to the results in Column 3, we find evidence that relative to control districts, real per-pupil current spending was trending higher in districts that adopted an ESPLOST prior to adoption. Specifically, all of the pre-policy adoption indictors are positive, statistically significant, and grow in magnitude over time. The clear evidence of a positive pre-trend in current spending among non-metro districts compliments the positive pre-trend in property tax receipts among these districts. More importantly, our finding that non-metro districts that adopted an ESPLOST were already experiencing increases in real per-pupil current expenditures prior to adoption, casts some doubt on whether the real per-pupil current spending results from our simpler DD models reported in Tables 4 and 6 have a causal interpretation. Again this stands in sharp contrast to our metro-district results where we find no evidence of a pre-trend in real per-pupil current spending.
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In the Online Appendix, we report additional robustness checks for our event study results. Tables 1A and 2A of the Online Appendix report results based on event study specifications where we include the same state and federal aid controls listed in Table  5 . Controlling for state and federal aid has little impact on our results: the estimates reported in Tables 1A and 2A are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in Tables 7 and 8. Tables 3A and 4A of the Online Appendix reports event study results based on specification where we limit the sample to fiscally independent school districts. Once again, this has little impact on our results. Notably, similar to the results reported in Table 8 , the current spending results reported in both Table 2A and 4A (non-metro districts) display clear evidence of a positive pre-trend.
The final issue we investigate relates to the timing of district adoption on an ESPLOST. Specifically, one concern with both our standard DD and event study models is that treatment status is based on the year a district in Georgia chose to adopt an ESPLOST. If the timing of adoption is correlated with unobserved time varying district-specific factors that also influence our outcomes of interest then our results may be biased. To examine that possibility, we also estimated event study models that define the treatment year as 1997 (the year Georgia adopted the ESPLOST program) for all school districts in Georgia. Thus, the estimated treatment effects from these models represent intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates since not all districts adopted in 1997. The results are presented in Table 7A and 8A of the Online Appendix and are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 7 and 8. The main difference between the two sets of results is that the estimates reported in Tables 7A and 8A tend to be smaller in magnitude, which is expected given those results represent ITT estimates.
VI. conclusIon
How do local governments respond when they are granted the ability to supplement or replace local property tax revenues with revenue from an alternative source? In this paper, we address that question by examining how the adoption and use of local option sales taxes affects the fiscal behavior of local governments. In November of 1996, school districts in Georgia were granted the ability to supplement or replace property tax revenues by imposing an ESPLOST to fund capital outlay projects and/or retire previously incurred debt. We exploit this unique natural experiment to provide causal evidence on how the adoption and use of local option sales taxes affected the fiscal decisions of local school districts.
Using both DD and event study methodologies we find that among districts located in MSAs, ESPLOST adoption led to significant increases in real per-pupil capital and current spending relative to control districts and significant declines in real per-pupil long-term debt and property tax receipts relative to control districts. Our event study results provide further evidence that these effects have a causal interpretation given that we find no evidence of pre-trends in any of our outcomes of interest prior to the adoption of an ESPLOST. For districts located outside of MSAs, our results also suggest that ESPLOST adoption led to a significant increase in real per-pupil capital spending relative to control districts. However, for non-MSA districts, we find no evidence that ESPLOST adoption caused a relative reduction in real per-pupil long-term debt or property tax burdens and mixed evidence on whether ESPLOST adoption led to a relative increase in real per-pupil current spending.
Our findings concerning the relationship between LOST adoption and the fiscal behavior of local governments may have several important policy implications. First, our results suggest that earmarking LOST revenues for a specific purpose generally leads to increased spending in the targeted area. Recall that the ESPLOST program was earmarked for two purposes: school facility investment and debt reduction. We find that the ESPLOST program has been generally successful in achieving those two outcomes. Among districts located in MSAs, we find that the ESPLOST program caused real perpupil capital spending to increase by 26.5 percent and real per-pupil debt to decline by approximately 24 percent, relative to control districts. These results are also consistent with a large body of literature that finds that targeted inter-governmental grants tend to "stick where they hit," a phenomena commonly known as the flypaper effect. 33 Second, our findings also suggest that even when LOST revenue is targeted towards specific areas it may still lead to higher spending in non-targeted areas. While the ESPLOST legislation specifically prohibited school districts from using ESPLOST funds to finance instructional spending, we find that ESPLOST adoption nevertheless led to approximately a 4 percent increase in current operating expenditures among metro-area districts.
Third, our results suggest that school districts located in MSAs appear to have benefited the most from the ESPLOST program. Specifically, while metro and non-metro area districts experienced similar increases in capital spending following the passage of the ESPLOST program, metro area districts appear to have experienced substantially higher levels of property tax and debt relief than their non-metro area counterparts. While these results are perhaps not overly surprising given that metro-area districts tend to have substantially larger sales tax bases and are better able to export taxes onto nonresidents who shop and consume within their areas, they nevertheless raise important distributional concerns about how LOSTs differentially impact urban and rural areas.
Finally, this paper contributes to a growing literature on the tax preferences of voters. Citizens in Georgia were given a simple choice -if schools needed to be built or modernized, they could choose to finance those capital investments with either the sales tax or the property tax. Across school districts the choice was universal: since passage of the ESPLOST program, not a single school district has returned to using the property tax as the primary funding mechanism for school infrastructure investment. This could be, as previously discussed, because of tax salience and/or sheer aversion to the property tax among voters. However, additional research is clearly needed as to why, once given the opportunity, voters abandoned the property tax for a more regressive and less stable source of revenue, namely the sales tax.
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